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Abstract
We consider international labor (entrepreneur) mobility in a two-
country overlapping-generations model. Interactions of decreasing and
increasing returns in production yield multiple equilibria that are sta-
ble under adaptive learning. Governments have an unilateral incentive
to reduce income taxes at the joint optimum. We compare the Nash
equilibrium in taxes under full labor mobility to the closed economy
with no mobility. Despite strategic tax setting, the free mobility out-
come is often better in welfare terms. Large, discrete gains in welfare
may be attained because of the tax competition. Expectational bar-
riers for discrete welfare improvements can be overcome through tax
competition.
Key words: tax policy, mobility of labor, multiple equilibria, ex-
pectation traps
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1 Introduction
International tax competition has attracted much interest in recent litera-
ture. At issue is the allocation of mobile tax bases (typically capital), the
location of which may be aﬀected by strategic policy choices (in particu-
lar, tax reductions) of governments eager to attract them. The fear is that
such unilateral and aggressive tax policies could prove harmful to aggregate
welfare since public services might have to be cut as tax revenues dwindle.1
Theoretical work has largely supported the above viewpoint. The Nash
equilibrium of the tax competition game has been shown to be inferior to
the hypothetical joint optimum that could be attained if tax policy toward
mobile activities were cooperatively determined. The Nash solution involves
a supply of public goods that is lower than jointly optimal and, because all
nations are compelled to select low taxes on mobile activities, no nation is
able to reap asymmetric, compensating gains for its sacrifice in tax revenue.
Explicit coordination of national tax policies is usually suggested as a remedy
for the potential welfare loss from tax competition.2
The diﬃculty with the tax coordination solution is, however, that such
cooperation seems to be very diﬃcult to achieve in practice. For example,
the EU has tried for many years to reach agreement on common levels and
other aspects of corporate taxation. Hence, comparing equilibria with tax
competition with a coordinated social optimum may not be the most natural
way to assess the role of globalization and tax competition. It would also
seem natural to compare equilibria with free mobility and tax competition
with what closed economies can achieve at best, i.e., country-wise social
optima when there is no international mobility of productive factors.
In this paper, we make the latter comparison and argue that there are
circumstances in which the opening of national borders and the resulting tax
competition can be positively helpful. The possibility that strategic tax set-
ting may actually improve welfare centers on two related phenomena: (i) the
1Sinn (2000, 2003) among others has highlighted the problems that tax competition
may pose for the European-style welfare state.
2The voluminous literature on tax competition is surveyed in Wilson (1999). See
Sorensen (2000), Wildasin (2000), and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002) for recent
empirical evidence. Persson and Tabellini (1992) suggested that consequences of tax com-
petition may be countered by adaptation of countries’ internal political systems. Edwards
and Keen (1996) show that tax competition may provide a useful constraint to self-serving
motivations of public decision makers.
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large, discrete jumps in employment, output, and welfare after comparative-
dynamic changes that can take place when there are multiple equilibria and
(ii) the fact that low expectations, accompanied by adaptive learning dynam-
ics, can block potential welfare improvements from being realized. We show
first that, by simply expanding factor flows, tax competition can sometimes
yield significant (discrete) welfare gains over socially optimal equilibria in
which individuals are internationally immobile (due to closed borders) but
are optimally taxed. Secondly, when multiple potential equilibria exist and
a low equilibrium is realized, tax competition can serve as an international
coordination mechanism that breaks the low expectations that support the
low output trap, thus creating a positive jump in output and welfare. Fur-
thermore, once a high output steady state has been reached, we show that
carefully chosen cooperative tax increases may be instituted without disturb-
ing the newly attained high equilibrium. Thus, while expectational dynamics
may cause stagnation at a low equilibrium trap, stability of equilibrium under
learning can also support cooperative taxation of mobile factors.
We employ a symmetric two-country version of the simple overlapping-
generations model of social increasing returns due to Evans and Honkapohja
(1995) to derive these results.3 (For a summary discussion of the model see
Section 4.6 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).) The model and the symmetry
assumption are naturally restrictive but they allow us to streamline our anal-
ysis. We assume that all individuals born in either country are potentially
mobile in their first period of life. Income earned is taxed according to the
source principle, and the tax revenues are spent to supply publicly provided
goods and services for individuals in their second period of life when they
no longer work. We deviate from the standard tax competition models by
treating the mobile individuals as household-producers or entrepreneurs. Ac-
cordingly, they do not exchange labor for a market wage but are, instead,
free to set up shop and oﬀer their services (measured in aggregate consump-
tion) in either country depending on the return to the service being oﬀered.
Individuals of this type comprise skilled professions (IT services, consulting,
entertainment, design, arts, etc.) and their services reflect the implicit stock
of human capital in existence.4 In our model lower taxes and international
3Wildasin and Wilson (1996) have developed an overlapping-generations model to an-
alyze land-value maximizing taxation under imperfect resident mobility.
4Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002) have analyzed international mobility of firms
when financial capital is also internationally mobile. Our model does not include financial
capital, but the individual entrepreneurs in our model could be interpreted as representing
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mobility of entrepreneurship can provide strong incentives to increase pro-
ductive eﬀort and to expand aggregate output. This increase can, moreover,
be magnified by increasing social returns in a certain range of aggregate
eﬀort.5
The possibility of large jumps in equilibria is due to the social increas-
ing returns of the model. In particular, we assume that while individual
(entrepreneurial) eﬀort is subject to decreasing returns in each location, ex-
ternal gains in productivity are reaped if the aggregate labor supply in a
location exceeds a minimum threshold level. The interaction of the positive
productivity externalities with the decreasing individual returns to eﬀort
yields the potential for multiple steady state solutions. Given such multiplic-
ities, changes in tax policy can induce endogenous jumps from one steady
state to another; we are particularly interested in determining the direction
of changes associated with tax competition.
We apply the concept of stability under adaptive learning so as to clas-
sify steady state equilibria.6 Under this criterion, stable equilibria will be
approached via an expectational adjustment process in which individuals
observe the outcome of the economic process at each point in time, adjust
their forecast functions, and learn about the equilibrium values of the model
variables. Near stable equilibria, expectational errors diminish directing the
economy toward a particular stable solution; in contrast, unstable steady
states cannot be reached because behavior will be altered to reflect the ever-
growing forecast errors near these equilibria.
Since equilibria that are unstable under learning cannot be approached by
small, gradual steps, an unstable steady state that separates a high output
equilibrium from an initial low output state forms an expectational barrier
that cannot be easily overcome. Only discrete changes in policy or other
exogenous disturbances of suﬃcient size can cause an upward jump in expec-
tations and the performance of the economy. We show that the seemingly
destructive tax competition can serve in this welfare improving role.
The contents of the paper are as follows. Section 2 describes the model
mobile entrepreneurial human capital (”firms”).
5The benefits from tax competition due to increased eﬀort are diﬀerent from benefits
that can emerge from agglomeration eﬀects and core-periphery equilibria, which have
recently been considered by Baldwin and Krugman (2004). They argue that the core
country can act as a Stackelberg leader and use a “limit taxation” strategy towards the
periphery.
6For an exhaustive discussion of adaptive learning, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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and characterizes the feasible steady states. Section 3 illustrates the gains
arising from international tax competition, and section 4 analyzes the role of
expectations in the maximization of such gains. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, we expand the Evans and Honkapohja (1995) overlapping-
generations model to include two symmetric countries,H(ome) and F (oreign),
that interact freely in commodity and factor markets. Autarky equilibria are
defined later by suitably adjusting this open economy model.
2.1 Production Technology
At any point in time, both countries H and F are the birthplace of a fixed
number (K) individuals who live for two time periods. In their first period
of life, the young work and sell aggregate consumption to the retired. Labor
is the only variable input. Individual production functions, identical to all
workers, are specified by
f(nj , Nj) = nαj ψ(Nj), f(n∗j , Nj) =
¡
n∗j
¢α ψ(Nj), j = H,F , (1)
where the nj (resp. n∗j) denote work performed in the two countries by those
born in H (resp. F ). Thus, the superscript ∗ indicates the location of birth
in F , whereas the subscripts j = H,F indicate the place of employment. The
production parameter α is assumed to be less than one so that decreasing
returns to individual eﬀort prevail.7
Increasing external returns to labor are represented by the function ψ in
(1). We assume that the external returns depend on the aggregate employ-
ment in a given location, i.e., in (1),
NH ≡ K(nH + n∗H), NF = K(n∗F + nF ). (2)
The function ψ is taken to be increasing in Nj; thus, the larger the total
supply of labor in country j, the higher the productivity of each worker in
that country.
7Individuals in their first period of life can be interpreted as entrepreneurs for whom
human capital is the fixed factor. While this human capital is not directly mobile, en-
trepreneurial eﬀort, measured by the variables nj and n∗j , is taken to be freely mobile.
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A particular functional form for social returns has been suggested by
Evans and Honkapohja (1995). According to this specification,
ψ(Nj) = max
hbI, Ijiβ , bI > 0, β ≥ 1, (3)
Ij ≡
λNj
1 + aλNj
, λ ∈ (0, 1) , a > 0. (4)
where j = H,F . By (3), aggregate employment must exceed an exogenous
threshold value, bI, before external productivity gains can be felt. If the labor
supplyNj is suﬃciently large, the multiplier Iβj (= ψ(Nj)) obtained from (3) is
substituted into the individual production functions (1). Otherwise, there are
no social returns to labor and the production functions include the constant
multiplier bIβ.
We imagine that the social gains in productivity reflect the sharing of ex-
periences and ideas that naturally takes place when individuals (entrepreneurs)
operate in some proximity to each other. The expression Ij in (4) represents
this sharing of ideas. In particular, we posit that new ideas are broadcast at
a uniform rate by all active workers and that, for any individual, the fraction
λ of ideas is suitable to be applied. Assuming that each worker needs a time
units to absorb and understand a new idea once it has arrived, the total time
required to receive and apply an usable idea equals a + (λNj)−1. Per fixed
unit time period, therefore, the total number of usable ideas that any active
individual receives is Ij = (a + (λNj)−1)−1 as specified in (4). This Ij is
increasing in the total labor supply, Nj , whereby external productivity gains
increase with aggregate employment. There is, however, an upper bound for
the gains; by (4), Ij approaches 1/a as Nj becomes very large.
2.2 Overlapping Generations
Welfare is derived from private consumption and public services. In the
following utility function, which applies to a representative individual born
in country H in the beginning of period t,
WH = U(cH,t+1)− V (nHt + nFt) + µU(GH,t+1), (5)
cH,t+1 denotes private consumption and the parameter µ gives the welfare
weight of publicly provided consumption, GH,t+1, both of which are enjoyed
in retirement in time period (t + 1) (the second period of life). Disutility
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of labor is reflected in the second term on the right-hand-side of (5). We
treat work performed in both locations symmetrically, i.e., we exclude any
psychological as well as monetary costs that may be associated with labor
mobility.8 The functions U and U are assumed to be increasing and concave,
while V is increasing and convex.
National governments independently provide benefits to the retired. In
order to supply such public consumption, the governments appropriate a
fraction τ j, j = H,F , of national output in each period. Accordingly, we
have
τ jYjt = Gjt, Yjt ≡ f(njt,Njt) + f(n∗jt, Njt), j = H,F, (6)
where Yjt gives the total per capita output of domestic and foreign workers
in country j in period t. The variables τ j define the national tax rates by
which individual income is taxed in each country.
The subsequent (per capita) budget constraints of a representative indi-
vidual who is born in H in period t and retires in period t+ 1 are
(1− τH)ptf(nHt,NHt) + (1− τF )ptf(nFt, NFt) =Mt, (7)
pet+1cH,t+1 =Mt. (8)
In (7) and (8), Mt stands for the net income, measured in money, that the
young in H plan to spend in retirement, and pet+1 is the price forecast for
future consumption by the workers in period t. (Identical forecasts for dif-
ferent individuals are assumed for simplicity.) Analogous budget constraints
apply to individuals born in country F.We assume common currency for the
two countries, and the stock of money is taken to be constant.
Labor supply is chosen so as to maximize life-time welfare (5) subject to
the constraints (7)-(8). Accordingly, when making their decisions, workers
consider the current price of consumption, the expected cost of consumption
in the future, the domestic and foreign tax rates on their earnings, the pro-
ductivity of labor in each country, and their personal disutility from having
to earn their living. Aggregate employment (NH , NF ) and public services
(GH , GF ) are taken as given in individuals’ optimization.
8This formulation is an extension of the Samuelson (1958) overlapping-generations
model. By (5), access to public services is contingent on nationality, meaning that only
public services of the home country can be used when retired. This eliminates any incentive
to migrate for social assistance purposes considered, e.g., by Sinn (2000, 2003) and Breyer
and Kolmar (2002)).
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Optimal labor supply is implicitly characterized by the first order condi-
tions
U 0(cH,t+1)
(1− τ j)pt
pet+1
f 0n(njt, Njt) = V 0(nHt + nFt), j = H,F, (9)
U 0(c∗F,t+1)
(1− τ j)pt
pet+1
f 0n(n∗jt, Njt) = V 0(n∗Ht + n∗Ft), j = H,F. (10)
By (9) and (10), the optimal nj and n∗j , j = H,F , equalize the marginal
expected returns to labor in the two markets and both are equal to the
marginal disutility of labor.9
The first order conditions (9)-(10) can be simplified by observing that
along a perfect foresight equilibrium path price forecasts are correct, i.e.,
pet+1 = pt+1, and the world market for private consumption (per capita)
clears in all periods, i.e.,
CWt ≡ cHt + c∗Ft = (1− τH)YHt + (1− τF )YFt (11)
for all t. Given the constant world supply of money (equal to M), market
clearing for the world requires that total nominal savings by the young equal
nominal money supply. Equivalently, CWt =M/pt, which yields
pt
pt+1
=
(1− τH)YH,t+1 + (1− τF )YF,t+1
(1− τH)YHt + (1− τF )YFt
=
CWt+1
CWt
(12)
in any symmetric equilibrium.
When substituted into the first order conditions (9)-(10) this price ratio
yields the following (per capita) labor oﬀer curves :
(1− τ j)U 0(cH,t+1)CWt+1 =
CWt V 0(nHt + nFt)
f 0n(njt,Njt)
, j = H,F, (13)
(1− τ j)U 0(c∗F,t+1)CWt+1 =
CWt V 0(n∗Ht + n∗Ft)
f 0n(n∗jt, Njt)
, j = H,F, (14)
where
cH,t+1 =
[(1− τH)f(nHt, NHt) + (1− τF )f(nFt, NFt)]CWt+1
CWt
, (15)
9Notation: f 0n denotes the partial derivative of the production function f with respect
to its first argument.
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c∗F,t+1 =
[(1− τH)f(n∗Ht, NHt) + (1− τF )f(n∗Ft, NFt)]CWt+1
CWt
. (16)
Equations (13)-(16), together with definitions (2) and (11), determine the
evolution of the four labor supply variables, (nj , n∗j), j = H,F , and thus
the evolution of aggregate employment in each country, (NH , NF ), is deter-
mined as well. The time paths of the remaining endogenous variables can
subsequently be solved by applying the previous definitions.
2.3 Symmetric Equilibria and Learning Dynamics
When the tax rates are the same in both countries (τH = τF = τ ) the
equilibrium values of all labor supply variables are equal - implying no net
mobility of labor - and the common steady-state value, denoted by n, can be
solved using one of the oﬀer curves (13)-(14).10
For the purposes of illustration and simplification, we often adopt the
isoelastic utility functions
U(c) = c
1−σ
1− σ , V (n) =
n1+
1 + 
, U(G) = G
1−σ
1− σ , 0 < σ, ε < 1. (17)
For these utility functions and assuming symmetry, equations (13)-(14) can
be reduced to11
n
1+ε
1−σ
t = 2
− (ε+σ)
1−σ α
1
1−σ (1− τ)nαt+1max
·bI, λNt+1
1 + aλNt+1
¸β
, Nt = 2Knt. (18)
Typical oﬀer curves in (nt+1, nt)-space are depicted in Fig. 1.12 We remark
that in order to depict the total per capita labor supply (including both
10When τH = τF = τ , we have pt/pt+1 = YWt+1/YWt = CWt+1/CWt in (13)-(16), where
YWt = YHt + YFt.
11Equation (18) is obtained using (1)-(4) and (17), and by noting that, due to symmetry,
YWt = 2Yt = 4f(nt, Nt) and nHt + nFt = 2nt.
12For a discussion of the shape of the oﬀer curves in a closed economy we refer to Evans
and Honkapohja (1995, 2001). The functional form of the open economy oﬀer curve (18) is
similar to that of the corresponding autarky curve, the diﬀerences being (i) the coeﬃcient
2−
(ε+σ)
1−σ that appears on the right-hand side of (18) and (ii) the definition of the aggregate
labor supply that equals Nt = Knt in autarky. See Section 3 below for a brief derivation
of the autarky oﬀer curve.
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domestic work eﬀort and any labor performed in the other country) the oﬀer
curves in Fig. 1 should be interpreted as twice the solution for nt in (18).
FIGURE 1: Oﬀer Curves and Steady States.
Oﬀer curves F , F 0 and F 00 in Fig. 1 comprise two concave segments, separated
by a kink. Immediately to the right of the kink, there may be a convex
segment as shown in Fig. 1.
The concave portions of the oﬀer curves are observed when individual
production technology (1) is subject to overall decreasing returns. Along the
first concave segment, to the left of the kink, per capita labor supply is too
low for external returns to labor to be felt and so decreasing returns must
prevail.13 The convex region to the right of the kink appears when external
productivity gains are suﬃciently strong to overcome individual decreasing
returns.14 But, since the positive externality eﬀect is bounded from above,
all oﬀer curves eventually turn concave as per capital labor supply increases;
this yields the second concave region on the oﬀer curves F , F 0 and F 00. (See
the Appendix, part 1), for a detailed qualitative derivation of the oﬀer curves
in Fig. 1.)
Three types of interior equilibria may be realized depending on the shape
of the oﬀer curve (18). (In addition, the equilibrium at the origin (nt = 0)
always exists.) First, there may be a unique interior steady state to the left
of the kink such as nLow on the oﬀer curve F in Fig. 1. At this equilibrium,
young generations work relatively little and output and consumption are
low. Second, a unique equilibrium may occur to the right of the kink, as is
the case at nHigh on the oﬀer curve F 00. At this steady state productivity
of labor is enhanced by external gains from worker interactions. The third
possibility is that there are multiple interior equilibria such as illustrated
by the steady states n0Low, nU , and n0High along F 0. At n0Low output and
consumption are much below those realized at the high equilibrium n0High.
Welfare is predictably aﬀected: for any given level of labor taxation, steady
state welfare is an increasing function of n across all steady states so that
all individuals must be better oﬀ at n0High than at n0Low.15
13In this region, Ij < bI and thus ψ(Nj) = bIβ in (1) is a constant.
14In this region, Ij > bI whereby ψ(Nj) = Iβ in (1) is increasing in Nj .
15Compare two steady states, indexed by 1 and 2, where n1 ≤ n2. Then, since the
production function f is increasing in N and the tax rate τ is fixed, welfare (as defined
in (5)) satisfies W (n1, N1) < W (n1, N2). Furthermore, since n2 (≥ n1) maximizes welfare
given N2 and τ , W (n1, N2) ≤W (n2, N2), and thus W (n1, N1) < W (n2, N2).
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We introduce dynamic adjustment paths toward equilibria using the adap-
tive learning approach. Accordingly, individuals in time period t are assumed
to base their decisions about how much and where to work on their expec-
tations regarding future values of economic variables. Expectations for time
period (t + 1) are formed by adjusting the formerly held expectations re-
garding time period t; the manner of the adjustment reflects the discrep-
ancy between the observed, realized, economy and the former expectations.
Through a process of ever more accurate forecasts and adjustments, some
steady states will eventually be approached; these equilibria are stable under
adaptive learning. Equilibria that cannot be reached by this sort of dynamic
learning process are unstable under adaptive learning.
The first order conditions (9)-(10) identify the quantity, the marginal
utility of consumption deflated by the forecast relative price of consump-
tion (U 0(ct+1)pt/pt+1), that the individuals are learning about. Given (12),
however, the price forecast may be replaced by predictions regarding labor
supply in the next time period, net+1.16 This is also suﬃcient to forecast
future consumption, ct+1, as indicated by (15) and (16).
The following simple learning rule formalizes the adaptive learning pro-
cess that yields net+1. Given an expected level of employment, net+1, the
optimal per capita labor supply for the current time period, nt, is deter-
mined from the labor oﬀer curve, i.e., using the notation of Fig. 1, nt =
F (net+1). The fixed points of this mapping are the steady state equilibria
of the model. If a steady state is not realized in time period t, oﬀer curve
F (net+1) yields a temporary equilibrium relative to the given expectation,
net+1. Then, being outside an equilibrium, workers adjusts their expectations
toward the currently realized level of employment and output. Formally,17
net+1 = net +
κ
t
(F (net)− net), κ > 0. (19)
The quantity κ/t is known as the gain parameter, and it determines the
degree of adjustment of expectations to forecast errors. (For κ = 1 and
16By (12), individuals may forecast Cj,(t+1), j = H,F, instead of pt+1. Given (1),
this is equivalent to forecasting nj,(t+1). Since the two economies are symmetric and all
individuals are identical (including the learning rules), it suﬃces to forecast the common
value nt+1. More elaborate formulations with explicit price forecasts could be applied, but
the stability properties of the equilibria would be unaﬀected. See Evans and Honkapohja
(2001: pp. 50-52) for the closed economy version of these arguments.
17This formulation for learning about steady states is common in the recent literature.
See Chapter 11 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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appropriate initial condition, net+1 is equal to the average of past values of
nt.)
The stability properties of the equilibria in Fig. 1 are determined by
Proposition 1 of Evans and Honkapohja (1995). Specifically, the interior
equilibria at which an oﬀer curve cuts the 45◦-line from above (n0Low and
n0High) are stable under learning, whereas equilibria at which the 45◦-line cuts
the oﬀer curve from above are unstable (nU). (For all 0 < net+1 < nU , the
economy converges to n0Low and, for all net+1 > nU , the economy converges
to n0High.) All unique interior equilibria (nLow and nHigh) are necessarily
stable. It is clear from Fig. 1 that, excluding unusual circumstances, unstable
equilibria, when they exist, will be located between two steady states that
are stable under adaptive learning.
3 Gains from Tax Competition
We now turn to comparisons of three particular equilibria: the Nash equilib-
rium in taxes that results from unilateral policy making, the joint optimum
obtained if labor taxes are set cooperatively, and autarky (where we assume
that taxes are set optimally). Our goal is to show that, even when accompa-
nied by international tax competition, free mobility of entrepreneurial labor
can yield significant (discrete) welfare gains over autarky.
Figures 2 compactly makes our point. In Fig. 2a we show three labor
oﬀer curves, labeled Fa, Fm and FNE, respectively. Of these, let Fm yield the
current (period t) per capita supply of services in an open economy at some
fixed level of income taxation, denoted by bτ . Given Fm, the interior steady
state at nm is observed.
FIGURES 2: Bifurcation from Tax Competition
Oﬀer curve Fa in Fig. 2a represents labor supply given bτ but in autarky.
In order to obtain curve Fa, we adjust the production functions (1), the utility
function (5), and the individuals’ budget constraints (7) so as to include
only domestic variables. Given these adjustments, equations (13)-(14) are
replaced by their autarky equivalents
(1− τ)U 0((1− τ)Yj,(t+1))Yj,(t+1) =
YjtV 0(njt)
f 0n(njt, Njt)
, j = H,F, (20)
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where Yjt ≡ f(njt, Njt), Nj = Knj. When utility functions are isoelastic,
equations (20) simplify and yield the autarky oﬀer curve
n
1+ε
1−σ
t = α
1
1−σ (1− τ)nαt+1max
·bI, λNt+1
1 + aλNt+1
¸β
, Nt = Knt, (21)
that is common for individuals in both countries.
Curve Fa in Fig. 2a depicts equation (21) when τ = bτ ; autarky steady
state is found at na. That Fa must be located below Fm can be seen by ob-
serving that the solutions for nt obtained using the two oﬀer curves, (18) and
(21), diﬀer by the multiplier 2
1−σ
1+ε (> 1), given any τ .18 This implies that, at
all levels of taxation and expected future employment (net+1), all individuals
work harder in an open economy than in autarky. (The interpretation of the
oﬀer curve FNE will be discussed shortly.)
Welfare around equilibria is illustrated in Fig. 2b. Curve Wm depicts
per capita well-being near the initial equilibrium nm and curve Wa applies
in autarky. Welfare as a function of the tax rate has an inverted U-shape as
shown in Fig. 2b if public consumption has a positive weight in the utility
function (5). (This condition guarantees that all individuals prefer some
positive tax rate to zero taxation and no provision of public consumption.
See the Appendix, part 2) for formal arguments.) The positive distance
between Wm and Wa in Fig. 2b reflects the gains from international factor
mobility that are obtained keeping the income tax rate fixed at bτ . These gains
are analogous to the well-known production gains from trade and are due to
the increase and reallocation of labor supply that accompany the dynamic
adjustment from autarky to free resource mobility. Since no commodity trade
takes place in symmetric equilibria, we can identify all gains with the factor
mobility.
In the comparison between Wm and Wa, the gains from labor mobility
are local, i.e., both the autarky equilibrium at na and the open economy
steady state nm are low productivity steady states and in neither are positive
externalities observed. We call this sort of a shift in an equilibrium of a
given type a local change (even when the change may involve a discrete
perturbation in the model variables as between na and nm). We have assumed
18When external productivity gains are present, the open economy solution for nt also
diﬀers from its autarky counterpart in that the aggregate labor supply Nt equals 2Knt
and not Knt as in autarky. This diﬀerence, when present, shifts the open economy oﬀer
curve further above the autarky Fa.
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in Fig. 2b that the common tax rate bτ maximizes welfare in autarky (along
Wa). That this same tax rate maximizes welfare when labor is mobile as well
(along Wm) is due to the fact that productive externalities are not present
near either steady state.19 In general, we have that τ opthigh ≤ τ
opt
low, where
τ opthigh is the tax rate jointly optimal when labor productivity is subject to
externalities and τ optlow is optimal when this is not the case (near na and nm).
The strict inequality applies when a reduction in the income tax results in
external productivity gains.
When the initial income tax is jointly optimal and labor is mobile, each of
the two countries usually has a unilateral incentive to undertake an asymmet-
ric tax reduction (see the Appendix, part 4), for formal arguments). Thus,
if there are no productive externalities, a leftward movement from bτ along
curve Wm is observed. That the resulting outcome of tax competition is
worse in welfare terms than the joint optimum is the standard argument
against international tax competition and, as shown in Fig. 2b, this argu-
ment is replicated in our model. Additional results follow, however, when we
allow for the possibility that tax competition may cause a bifurcation in the
set of equilibria.
In order to illustrate this possibility, we return to Fig. 2a. According
to the following lemma, labor oﬀer curves shift up (while leaving the origin
unchanged) if income taxes are symmetrically reduced. (See the Appendix,
part 5), for a proof.)
Lemma 1 Near a symmetric equilibrium (where τH = τF = τ) and given
any expected level of future employment, net+1, a common reduction in the
income taxes τH and τF is followed by an expansion in the per capita labor
supply, nt.
Accordingly, an oﬀer curve such as FNE, entirely above Fm, applies when
taxes are Nash. A possible Nash (steady state) equilibrium is identified by
point nNE on FNE.
The adjustment from an initial steady state such as na (or nm) to the
Nash equilibrium at nNE is not a local change but a large discrete jump
19For brevity, our discussion here focuses on the straightforward case, where (i) increas-
ing returns are not reachable under autarky at any positive tax rates and (ii) increasing
returns are not reached at tax rate τˆ under entrepreneurial mobility. We will relax (ii)
below.
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(bifurcation) in all economic variables. Due to the large expansion in la-
bor supply that follows the competitive tax reduction in Fig. 2a, a new,
higher productivity, regime of production is established.20 New steady state
equilibria corresponding to this high output regime are located on the sec-
ond concave segment of the oﬀer curve FNE near nNE, and these equilibria
appear only when the labor taxes are suﬃciently low. At these low levels
of taxation, the low output steady states near nm are eliminated (equilibria
along the first concave segment of FNE do not exist).
The discrete welfare gain that is correspondingly experienced is illustrated
by the jump from an initial equilibrium on Wa (or on Wm) to nNE on WNE
in Fig. 2b. (Curve WNE, which depicts individual well-being near the high
output equilibria, does not coincide with Wm because the two welfare curves
correspond to diﬀerent production regimes.) The fact that nonlocal welfare
improvements of this type are feasible in our model shows that tax competi-
tion can play a surprising positive role: by amplifying the output expansion
that follows the liberalization of resource flows, a noncooperative tax reduc-
tion may push competing economies much beyond their customary levels of
performance. If this happens, it is likely that the realized growth in output
and consumption dwarfs the still unrealized potential gain that could be at-
tained from cooperative taxation. In other words, even though, in Fig. 2b,
the Nash equilibrium in taxes, nNE, is worse than the cooperative overall
optimum, indicated by point W optm on WNE, it is nevertheless significantly
better than any initial equilibrium on Wm or Wa.21
The following proposition identifies a suﬃcient condition under which the
movement from autarky to the Nash equilibrium in taxes is, in our context, an
overall welfare improvement, despite the fact that taxes are noncooperatively
set (the proof is given in the Appendix, part 6)).
Proposition 2 Let utility functions be isoelastic and assume that the model
parameters satisfy the inequality
(1 + µ
1
σ )
σ
1−σ < 21−α. (22)
Then, all individuals strictly prefer free labor mobility and the Nash equilib-
rium in taxes to national social optimum under autarky.
20Here bifurcations are assumed to occur after the move from nm to the Nash equilibrium
nNE , so that the Nash equilibrium is associated with a unique high employment steady
state. Subsequent discussion will also incorporate other possibilities.
21In Fig. 2b, the tax rate τoptm is jointly optimal. The Nash tax τNE is generally lower
than τoptm . See the Appendix, part 4), for formal details.
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Proposition 2 shows that labor mobility and tax competition can produce
gains such that the open economy, even under strategic taxation, is strictly
better than autarky. In this sense, even if the Nash equilibrium in taxes
may still be worse than the hypothetical joint optimum, tax competition,
when compared to autarky, is not necessarily a race to the bottom; outcomes
that are much worse could be the result of restricting individual freedom
of movement. This observation oﬀers some theoretical support to Bhagwati
(2002) who has argued that standard criticisms of tax competition (that such
competition inevitably leads to a race to the bottom) are little supported by
empirical evidence.
Condition (22), which involves the technology and preference parameters,
α and σ, and the welfare weight for public goods, µ, is used to ensure that
international mobility or workers induces a suﬃcient increase in labor supply
and output for all to benefit from such mobility. The term on the right-hand
side of (22) determines the scope for production gains from openness (as α
approaches one, technology approaches constant returns and the right-hand
side term declines; thus, opportunities for welfare gains from international
mobility diminish). On the left-hand side, as σ increases (i.e., the demand
elasticity (1 − σ) declines), there is less scope for utility gains from any
increase in output and, as the preference for public goods increases (µ grows),
the left-hand side of (22) similarly increases. In extreme cases, if µ is very
high, factor mobility and tax competition may reduce welfare. Given (22),
however, an equilibrium such as nNE strictly dominates autarky.22
Proposition 2 is not conditional on the existence of favorable bifurcations.
Accordingly, if condition (22) is satisfied, even when there are no productive
externalities the Nash equilibrium (on Wm) must still be a welfare improve-
ment compared to autarky (on Wa). In Figs. 2, overall welfare gains are
enhanced by the discrete jump in the production regime that creates the
high output equilibria near nNE (on WNE) but while such large improve-
ments may arise from tax competition, gains attributed to bifurcations in
equilibria are by no means necessary for openness to be desirable.
Bifurcational gains cannot exist unless there are multiple production
regimes. In the present simple model, production externalities are the source
of potential multiplicities. Technological complementarities can also serve in
22We emphasize that since condition (22) is only a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condi-
tion for a welfare improvement, the Nash equilibrium may dominate autarky even when
(22) fails.
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this role; see Honkapohja and Turunen-Red (2002). Fig. 2a suggests that
favorable bifurcations are more likely when (i) autarky taxes are high (so
that the initial equilibrium is a low output state, analogous to na), (ii) tax
competition involves a large reduction in taxes (so that individual incentives
are significantly altered), and (iii) the high production regime can be easily
accessed (the kink in oﬀer curve Fm occurs at a low value of nt+1).23 Beyond
the current model is the possibility that there may be several production
regimes, each separated by a productivity threshold, some of which may oc-
cur at relatively low levels of employment and output (so that the externality
gains can reasonably be accessed).
While we have emphasized the role of tax competition in generating fa-
vorable bifurcations, upward jumps in equilibria may arise solely because
individuals become internationally mobile and even when taxation remains
unchanged. This possibility can be illustrated in Fig. 2a by shifting oﬀer
curve Fm up until a high productivity equilibrium (such as nNE on FNE)
appears and the low steady state (nm) is eliminated. In such a case, tax
competition merely yields an additional local improvement in productivity
(a further shift up in the oﬀer curve) and welfare but it does not further
change the production regime. While this latter possibility of bifurcational
welfare gains arising from international openness alone may appear more in-
tuitively obvious24, we have attempted to show that tax competition, through
its expansionary eﬀects on labor supply, works in the same direction as any
liberalization of factor flows. Accordingly, even when not being the cause
of bifurcational jumps in equilibria, tax competition may still significantly
increase the positive welfare impact of free factor mobility.
4 Tax Competition and Expectational Barri-
ers
Expectations have a significant role to play when there are multiple equilibria.
In order to illustrate the interplay of expectations and changes in policy we
apply our previous Fig. 1.
23The kink shifts to the left in Fig. 1 if population expands (K increases), the fraction
of useful ideas among ideas broadcast (λ) increases, the time it takes an individual to
absorb an idea (a) decreases, or if the exogenous employment treshold bI gets smaller.
24Honkapohja and Turunen-Red (2002) demonstrate that bifurcational gains may arise
from international trade in capital goods.
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Let us assume that oﬀer curve F in Fig. 1 applies in autarky (when
τ = bτ) and F 0 depicts per capita labor supply when individuals are mobile
but taxes remain fixed at bτ . Then, as we move from autarky to complete
openness, the set of equilibria expands from a single low output state (nLow)
to a set of three potential steady states along F 0. Of these, n0High yields
welfare much higher than n0Low and a seemingly average equilibrium exists at
nU . Which of these three equilibria is actually realized when individuals are
free to work anywhere they choose? The answer is: n0Low.
Why is n0High unattainable? The reason revolves around the expectational
dynamics that we have assumed govern individual reactions to changes in
the economic environment. In order to reach the high output steady state
at n0High all individuals must work much harder so as to overcome the em-
ployment threshold that restricts the functioning of productive externalities.
While per capita labor supply does respond positively as oﬀer curve F 0 is
reached and expectations are accordingly adjusted upwards, there is along
F 0 an expectational barrier that cannot easily be overcome: as employment
and output approach the unstable equilibrium nU from below, errors in in-
dividual expectations grow and, following the learning rule (19), all respond
by moving back toward the lower, but expectationally stable, steady state at
n0Low. Essentially, n0High is unattainable because all believe so.
Our Fig. 1 suggests a possible remedy for this expectational impasse.
A further upward shift in oﬀer curve F 0 can, when the shift is suﬃciently
large, eliminate both the low output equilibrium near n0Low and the unstable
steady state nU . And such a shift in the oﬀer curve may take place when the
countries compete in taxes. In other words, vigorous tax competition may
end up selecting among feasible equilibria the one at which welfare is highest.
Compared to autarky, such an outcome must be welfare improving.
Proposition 3 If tax competition selects among multiple (stable) equilibria,
then all individuals prefer free labor mobility and the Nash equilibrium in
taxes to autarky.
Proposition 3 brings to the fore the expectational dynamics that guide
individuals and the economy from one (stable) equilibrium to another. Since
expectations are adjusted so as to reduce forecast errors, only equilibria that
are stable with respect to this learning behavior can be approached. If in-
dividuals are habitually expecting a low steady state (such as n0Low) to be
realized, they will not find their way to a higher, yet feasible, steady state
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(e.g., n0High) if that state is separated by an expectational barrier from the
current equilibrium. To overcome the expectational hurdle, some further
change is required. The above discussion suggests that tax competition for
mobile resources can assume this constructive policy role.
Of course, one may argue that, in a situation such as depicted in Fig. 1,
governments have a strong incentive to cooperate as by doing so they may
be able to attain a high output state near or above n00High. Yet, the point
of Proposition 3 is that, even if such cooperation were eventually feasible,
cooperation may not be necessary because noncooperative policies can yield
a nearly equivalent outcome. From this point of view, tax competition may
at times be a reasonable substitute for tax cooperation.
There is an additional observation regarding cooperative tax policy that
can be obtained using Fig. 1 and Proposition 3. One may imagine two
scenarios for the factor market liberalization to be played out. First, countries
may agree on a gradual approach in which factor flows are slowly freed and
taxes are adjusted in small cooperative moves. Or, cooperation may fail,
leading to temporary tax competition before some cooperative tax agreement
is eventually reached. The second alternative may appear inferior of the two.
Fig. 1 suggests there are circumstances where the opposite is the case.
If the gradual approach is taken, the low output steady state (n0Low) will
be observed as long as that equilibrium continues to exist and gains from
openness remain only local. However, tax competition, even when tempo-
rary, may cause a large shift in work habits and expectations so that a high
welfare state (n00High) becomes established. And what is most important, once
individuals have learned the existence of the high equilibrium, gradual (coop-
erative) tax increases can be undertaken and these will not cause a backward
reversal to the low output state (near n0Low).
The last conclusion follows because the same expectational inertia that
can make it diﬃcult for an economy to learn its way to a new and better
equilibrium tends to maintain the high output state (near n00High) once it has
been realized. Only a very large discrete increase in taxation could cut ex-
pectations suﬃciently for the low output state (n0Low) to be re-established
(the tax increase would have to be large enough to eliminate both n00High and
the unstable equilibrium near nU that will appear as τ increases). Thus,
there clearly can be circumstances in which the seemingly prudent, careful
and gradual (cooperative) policy path is worse than the path of liberalization,
tax competition, and possible cooperative adjustments only later. These con-
clusions apply whenever there is reason to believe that an economy is capable
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of sudden productivity and growth spurts.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed consequences of factor mobility and tax com-
petition in a simple two-country overlapping generations model. A special
feature of the model is the multiplicity of equilibria that reflects the interac-
tions of increasing and decreasing returns to scale in production.
When productive resources are internationally mobile, countries have an
incentive to attract them by cutting taxes. Such tax competition can reduce
gains from factor trade by forcing governments to curtail public services if tax
revenue falls. Literature on tax competition has duly observed that the Nash
equilibrium in taxes when resources are mobile is worse in welfare terms than
the joint optimum that could be attained if countries were able to agree on
coordinated tax policies. But, since tax coordination is always politically and
practically diﬃcult, in this paper we have compared the Nash equilibrium
in taxes to the other alternative: autarky (no factor mobility) and optimal
national taxation.25 Our comparison may well be the realistic one between
possible alternatives that do not require international political cooperation.
We have been particularly interested in the ability of tax competition
enhance (not reduce) the gains from factor mobility. These gains come from
two sources. First, lower taxes expand the supply of the mobile factors and,
when there are externalities, there may be additional productivity benefits
that can be reaped. In Section 3, we showed that, even without externalities,
the Nash equilibrium in taxes can be better than the autarky alternative.
Whether this is so depends on the parameters that determine the magnitude
of the production gains from trade and the degree to which these gains are
transformed into welfare improvements.
We also demonstrated that tax competition can be the source of new,
large, bifurcational gains in welfare. Such gains are realized when the low-
ering of taxes causes a discrete shift in the supply of the mobile factors and
this change is suﬃciently large to significantly alter individual expectations.
Then, it may be possible for the economy to reach a new high-employment,
high-output, steady state.
25We consider autarky but our results could be generalized to allow for limited factor
mobility as well. This could be done by augmenting the model by a parameter that
represents costs of factor mobility.
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Finally, we observed that since expectations impact the current factor
supply, the large potential gains from mobility that potentially exist may
not be reaped if individual expectations remain persistently low. In such
circumstances, tax competition may be helpful because it perturbs the status
quo and encourages individuals to work much harder. Most significantly,
once the new reality of a much higher equilibrium has been learned be all,
the high welfare steady state can still be sustained even if some cooperative
tax increases were to be undertaken. In other words, a seemingly radical
policy choice of significant change, followed by cooperation at a later stage,
may sometimes be better than the gradual and cooperative approach that
never shocks the economy out of its present path.
In the current model, taxation finances intergenerational transfers from
the young who work to the retired who consume. These social benefits are
distributed according to the nationality principle according to which the old
generations enjoy only the public goods that their native countries provide.
By this device we have excluded the possibility that social benefits themselves
may encourage factor flows. We also do not allow for individual heterogene-
ity; this rules out intragenerational transfers for redistribution purposes that,
again, can motivate decisions to migrate. Since our main goal has been to
point out the likelihood of overall gains from factor mobility and the posi-
tive role that tax competition may play by creating additional discrete gains
in welfare, we have chosen a simple framework in which the motivation for
international mobility is, as in traditional tax competition literature, the net
return to services. Nevertheless, future work in relaxing some of our assump-
tions remains desirable.
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1) Qualitative derivation of the oﬀer curves in Fig. 1: By (3)-(4),
when λNt+1(1 + aλNt+1) < bI (to the left of the kink on the oﬀer curves in
Fig 1), we have ψ(Nj) = bIβ and equation (18) yields
nt =
h
(1− τ )bIβα 11−σ 2 ε+σ1−σ i 1−σ1+ε nα(1−σ)1+εt+1 . (23)
Since the parameters α, σ, and ε are positive and less than one, nt is a
concave function of nt+1.
When λNt+1(1+aλNt+1) > bI (to the right of the kink on the oﬀer curves
in Fig. 1), we have
nt = 2
β(1−σ)−(ε+σ)
1+ε n
(α+β)(1−σ)
1+ε
t+1
h
(1− τ )bIβα 11−σ i 1−σ1+ε · Kλ
(1 + 2aλKnt+1)
¸β(1−σ)
1+ε
.
(24)
It can be shown (see Evans and Honkapohja (1995), p. 220) that when
σ < 1, there can be a convex segment on oﬀer curve (24), as long as nt+1 >
(bIλ−1(1−abI)−1)K−1, i.e., we are on the right-hand side of the kink (the kink
is defined by the equation nt+1 = (bIλ−1(1− abI)−1)K−1). As nt+1 increases,
oﬀer curve (24) eventually becomes concave.
2) Welfare has an inverted U-shape as a function of the tax rate
in Fig. 2b: First, consider autarky (curve Wa). In autarky and given (5),
welfare equals
Wa(τ , na) = U((1− τ)Y (na))− V (na) + µU(τY (na)), (25)
where Y (na) = f(na, Na) ≡ Ya. Thus,
∂Wa
∂τ
= U 0
·
(1− τ)∂Ya
∂τ
− Ya
¸
− V 0∂na
∂τ
+ µU 0
·
τ
∂Ya
∂τ
+ Ya
¸
, (26)
and
∂Ya
∂τ
= (f 01 +Kf 0N )
∂na
∂τ
. (27)
Given the autarky first order condition (20), (28) gives
∂Wa
∂τ
= [µU 0 − U 0]Ya + [U 0(1− τ)Kf 0N + µU 0τ(f 01 +Kf 0N)]
∂na
∂τ
. (28)
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Since ∂na/∂τ is negative (see the derivation of the employment derivatives
below in part 4) and −U 0Y < 0, the sign of the total welfare derivative is
determined by the relative magnitude of the term µU 0 (> 0) in (28).26
Assuming the isoelastic utility functions (17), however, we obtain that
the first bracketed term of (28) equals
[µU 0 − U 0]Ya = [µ(τYa(t))−σ − ((1− τ )Ya(τ))−σ]Ya (29)
= [µτ−σ − (1− τ )−σ]Y 1−σa .
As τ approaches zero, this term grows arbitrarily large but the second (neg-
ative) bracketed term in (28) has a finite limit. Thus, when τ is near zero,
the welfare derivative (28) is positive. Accordingly, when taxes and publicly
provided consumption are low, total welfare is increasing with respect to τ .
When τ increases, however, steady state production Ya converges towards
zero and will reach zero at some value of τ . (In Fig. 2a, the oﬀer curve
rotates downwards around the origin as τ increases.) Thus, when the tax
rate increases the second bracketed term in (28) is likely to dominate. Then,
total welfare in decreasing in τ .
In the open economy, we evaluate the sum of the derivatives ∂WHm /∂τH
and ∂WHm /∂τF at a symmetric equilibrium where τH = τF = τ . (Here
subscript m refers to “mobility”.) With respect to changes in the domestic
tax in Home, the welfare derivative equals
∂WHm
∂τH
= U 0
·
∂cH
∂τH
¸
− V 0
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
¸
+ µU 0
·
τH
∂YH
∂τH
+ YH
¸
, (30)
where YH = f(nH ,NH) + f(n∗H ,NH) and, with respect to changes in the
foreign tax,
∂WHm
∂τF
= U 0
·
∂cH
∂τF
¸
− V 0
·
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂nF
∂τF
¸
+ µU 0
·
τH
∂YH
∂τF
¸
. (31)
Furthermore, since cH = (1 − τH)f(nHt, NHt) + (1 − τF )f(nFt, NFt) at a
steady state,
∂cH
∂τH
= −f(nH ,NH)− (1− τ)f 01
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
¸
+ (32)
K(1− τ)f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
+
∂n∗F
∂τH
¸
,
26For brevity, we assume that the interior steady state is unique and of low type for the
considered domain of values of τ .
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∂cH
∂τF
= −f(nF , NF )− (1− τ)f 01
·
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂nF
∂τF
¸
+ (33)
K(1− τ)f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂nF
∂τF
+
∂n∗H
∂τF
+
∂n∗F
∂τF
¸
∂YH
∂τH
= (f 01+2Kf 0N)(
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
), ∂YH
∂τF
= (f 01+2Kf 0N )(
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂n∗H
∂τF
). (34)
The employment derivatives are computed below in part 3) of the Appendix.
Substituting (32)-(34) into (30)-(31) and applying the first order condi-
tions (13)-(14) yields
∂WHm
∂τH
= −U 0f(nH ,NH) + µU 0YH (35)
+µU 0τ (f 01 + 2Kf 0N )
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
¸
+U 0K(1− τ)f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
+
∂n∗F
∂τH
¸
,
∂WHm
∂τF
= −U 0f(nF , NF ) + µU 0τ (f 01 + 2Kf 0N )
·
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂n∗H
∂τF
¸
(36)
+U 0K(1− τ)f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂nF
∂τF
+
∂n∗H
∂τF
+
∂n∗F
∂τF
¸
.
Hence,
∂WHm
∂τH
+
∂WHm
∂τF
= µU 0YH − U 0 [f(nH , NH) + f(nF , NF )] (37)
+µU 0τ(f 01 + 2Kf 0N)
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
+
∂nH
∂τF
+
∂n∗H
∂τF
¸
+2U 0K(1− τ)f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
+
∂n∗F
∂τH
¸
.
The first term in the above welfare derivative is positive and the other terms
are negative. However, due to symmetry, we obtain that
µU 0YH − U 0 [f(nH , NH) + f(nF ,NF )] = [µU 0 − U 0]YH ,
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in (37); further, GH = τYH and, by symmetry, cH = (1 − τ )YH . Thus,
arguments analogous to the autarky case apply in the open economy as well,
and welfare as a function of the tax rate has an inverted U-shape as claimed.¥
3) Labor derivatives: For the isoelastic utility functions and taking
into account production technology (1) equations (9)-(10) yield the following
characterization of the steady state:
α(1− τH)c−σH nα−1H Ψ(NH) = (nH + nF )ε, (38)
α(1− τF )c−σH nα−1F Ψ(NF ) = (nH + nF )ε, (39)
α(1− τF )c∗(−σ)F n
∗(α−1)
F Ψ(NF ) = (n
∗
H + n∗F )ε, (40)
α(1− τH)c∗(−σ)H n
∗(α−1)
H Ψ(NH) = (n
∗
H + n∗F )ε. (41)
Furthermore, in (38)-(41), the consumption terms equal
cH = (1− τH)f(nH , NH) + (1− τF )f(nF , NF ), (42)
c∗F = (1− τH)f(n∗H , NH) + (1− τF )f(n∗F , NF ). (43)
Equations (38)-(41) can also be written in the form
α(1− τH)c−σH nα−1H Ψ(NH) = (1 +M
1
1−α )εnεH , (44)
α(1− τF )c∗(−σ)F n
∗(α−1)
F Ψ(NF ) =
"
1 +M
1
1−α
M
1
1−α
#ε
n∗F ε, (45)
R ≡ Ψ(NF )
Ψ(NH)
(1− τF )
(1− τH)
, (46)
cH = nαH
h
(1− τH)Ψ(NH) + (1− τF )R
α
1−αΨ(NF )
i
, (47)
c∗F = n
∗(α)
F
·
(1− τF )Ψ(NF ) +
(1− τH)Ψ(NH)
R
α
1−α
¸
. (48)
If we solve the above equations at a symmetric equilibrium, we obtain (as
τH = τF = τ ) that
nH = α
1
zΨ(N)
1−σ
z
(1− τH)
1−α+ε
z(1−α) [2− τH − τF ]−
σ
zh
(1− τH)
1
1−α + (1− τF )
1
1−α
i ε
z
. (49)
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=
α 1z (1− τ) 1−σz Ψ(N) 1−σz
2
ε+σ
z
.
Diﬀerentiation of (44) yields
DdnH = T1dτH + T2dτF , (50)
D = −α(1− τH)Ψ(NH)nα−2H c
−(1+σ)
H
·
(1− α)cH + σnH
∂cH
∂nH
¸
− εnε−1H 2ε < 0,
T1 = αnα−1H Ψ(NH)c
−σ−1
H
·
cH + σ(1− τH)
∂cH
∂τH
¸
+ nεH
ε2ε−1
(1− α)(1− τH)
> 0,
T2 = σα(1− τH)nα−1H Ψ(NH)c−σ−1H
∂cH
∂τF
− nεH
ε2ε−1
(1− α)(1− τH)
< 0,
∂cH
∂nH
= 2αnα−1H (1− τ)Ψ(NH) > 0,
∂cH
∂τH
= −nαHΨ(NH) < 0,
∂cH
∂τF
= −nαFΨ(NF ) < 0.
Therefore, we obtain
∂nH
∂τH
=
∂n∗F
∂τF
=
T1
D
< 0, (51)
∂nH
∂τF
=
∂n∗F
∂τH
=
T2
D
> 0. (52)
In addition, because nF = R
1
1−αnH, we have that
∂nF
∂τH
=
∂n∗H
∂τF
=
∂nH
∂τH
+
nH
1− α
∂R
∂τH
=
T1
D
+
nH
(1− α)(1− τH)
,
∂nF
∂τF
=
∂n∗H
∂τH
=
dnH
∂τF
+
nH
1− α
∂R
∂τF
=
T2
D
− nH
(1− α)(1− τH)
.
The labor supply derivatives imply: (i) the world labor supply declines if
one country increases its tax, i.e.,
∂nF
∂τH
+
∂n∗F
∂τH
+
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
=
2(T1 + T2)
D
< 0;
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(ii) a common change of taxes reduces each country’s domestic (internal)
labor supply, i.e.,
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nH
∂τF
=
T1 + T2
D
< 0;
(iii) in each country, a domestic tax increase reduces total labor supply, i.e.,
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
=
T1 + T2
D
− nH
(1− α)(1− τH)
< 0.
4) Each country unilaterally lowers its tax when the symmetric
tax is jointly optimal: At a symmetric equilibrium, the jointly optimal
(common) tax rate, τ opt, is characterized by the equations·
∂W jm
∂τH
+
∂W jm
∂τF
¸
|τH=τF=τopt= 0, j = H,F, (53)
where the welfare derivatives are as in (35)-(36). We want to argue that,
at the joint optimum,
£
∂WHm /∂τH
¤ |optimum< 0, i.e., each country has a
unilateral incentive to lower its own tax.
Given (35), equation (53) yields for (36) that
∂WHm
∂τF
|optimum= −µU 0YH + U 0f(nF , NF )− µU 0τ(f 0n + 2Kf 0N)
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
¸
(54)
−U 0K(1− τ)f 0N
·
∂nH
∂τH
+
∂nF
∂τH
+
∂n∗H
∂τH
+
∂n∗F
∂τH
¸
.
If ∂WHm /∂τF is positive at the joint optimum, then ∂WHm /∂τH < 0 at this
optimum as we require.
The first term on the right-hand side of (54) is negative but the other
terms are positive. In particular, if we consider only the first two terms of
(54), we obtain (using the symmetry of the equilibrium and the isoelastic
utility functions) that
−µU 0(GH)YH + U 0(cH)f(nF , NF ) = f(nH , NH) [U 0(cH)− 2µU 0(GH)] , (55)
cH = 2(1− τ opt)f(nH), GH = 2τ optf(nH).
Thus, ∂WHm /∂τF > 0 if
U 0(cH)− 2µU 0(GH) > 0,
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or equivalently,
MRScG ≡
U 0(cH)
µU 0(GH)
=
1
µ
·
τ opt
1− τ opt
¸σ
> 2.
Accordingly, each country wishes to unilaterally lower its tax rate if the
jointly optimal tax is suﬃciently large compared to the weight of public
services in individual welfare. Certainly, when the weight of public services
in welfare is not very high (µ tends to zero), this suﬃcient (but not necessary)
condition is satisfied.
5) Proof of Lemma 1: Given that τH = τF = τ , the price ratio pt/pt+1
in (12) equals Y Wt+1/Y Wt . Thus, equations (13)-(14) yield
(1− τ)U 0(ct+1)Y Wt+1 =
Y Wt V 0(2nt)
f 01(nt,Nt)
. (56)
Given nt+1, the left-hand side of (56) is decreasing in τ . Consequently,
the right-hand side of (56) is decreasing in τ as well. But since the term
Y Wt V 0(2nt)/f 01(nt) is increasing in nt (since V is convex and f is concave in
n), the nt determined by (56) must increase as the tax rate τ declines.¥
6) Proof of Proposition 2: Consider first the case without productive
externalities. Then, as a function of na, autarky welfare (for either country)
satisfies the inequality
Wa(τ , na) = U((1− τ )Y (na))− V (na) + µU(τY (na)) (57)
=
Y (na)1−σ
1− σ
£
(1− τ )1−σ + µτ 1−σ
¤
− n
1+ε
a
1 + ε
≤W uppera (na) ≡
(1 + µ 1σ )σ
(1− σ) na
α(1−σ)bIβ(1−σ) − n1+εa
1 + ε
.
Inequality (57) is obtained by replacing the term [(1− τ)1−σ + µτ 1−σ] in the
welfare expression by its maximum value with respect to τ (the maximum
occurs at τ = µ 1σ /(1 + µ 1σ )). Further, maximizing W uppera (na) with respect
to na yields
Wa(τ , na) ≤ Sα
1+ε
z bI β(1−σ)(1+ε)z h1 + µ 1σ iσ(1+ε)z , (58)
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S ≡ z
α(1− σ)(1 + ε) , z ≡ 1 + ε− α(1− σ). (59)
When individuals are freely mobile and taxes are Nash, welfare is at least
as high as when taxes are equal to zero (this is because welfare has an inverted
U-shape as a function of τ ). When taxes are zero, welfare is derived solely
from private market activities and equals
Wmobτ=0 = S [2n]
1+ε , (60)
where n = α 1z 2−
(ε+σ)
z bI β(1−σ)z as can be determined using (18). Substituting
this expression into (60) yields
Wmobτ=0 = Sα
1+ε
z 2
(1+ε)(1−σ)(1−α)
z bI β(1−σ)(1+ε)z . (61)
Comparison of (61) and (58) yields Wmobτ=0 ≥W uppera if (22) is satisfied.
If external productivity gains exist in autarky, they will also be observed
when labor is mobile (labor supply in each country is larger when workers are
mobile). The output expansion caused by the externality is therefore larger
in the open economy than in autarky. Thus, Proposition 2 still holds.
If there are no productive externalities in autarky but such gains appear
when individuals are mobile, Proposition 2 is guaranteed to hold given (22).¥
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Figure 2b: Bifurcation Gain from Tax Competition
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